The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Generation of Electricity in Puerto Rico Post-Maria

In the last few posts, I have been looking at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ (USACE) efforts to restore Puerto Rico’s electric grid after Hurricanes Irma and Maria. As I noted earlier, the USACE is not leading these efforts. It is part of the Power Restoration Task Force to Coordinate the Restoration Efforts, which is headed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Puerto Rico’s government.

The USACE’s efforts have been guided by a four-part strategy, which includes: (1) the installation of emergency power generation; (2) restoring electricity generation to the pre-Maria average of 2500-3000 megawatts (MW); (3) repair of the grid’s transmission system; and (4) the rebuilding of the distribution system.

Since 18 October 2017, the USACE has regularly provided a snapshot of PREPA’s electricity generation capacity. Echoing the Puerto Rican government’s information portal, StatusPR, electricity generation is expressed as a percentage. StatusPR’s measurement is problematic because it does not specify how much electricity the island’s power plants are producing at a given point in time. The USACE’s statistics are more useful as they provide the actual megawatts of electricity being produced on a daily basis. For example, on 16 February 2018, electricity generation stood at 1928 MW, while it was 2008 MW four days later.

The USACE’s numbers show that we can measure power generation via three different mechanisms. First, we can calculate the actual generation of megawatts per day, which the following graph captures.

chart (3)

Because the USACE’s goal is to restore the grid’s generation capacity to between 2500 and 3000 megawatts, we can calculate the daily amount of power generation against these two goals. In the next graph, the blue line represents the actual percentage of generated power reported by the USACE’s infographics and StatusPR. This is the actual number consistently reported by the media in their reporting. Thus, on 20 February 2018 the reported percentage is 85%.

The red line uses 2500 MW as the goal, while the yellow line sets the goal to 3000 MW. In this manner, each line represents the percentage of generated electricity based on these goals. On 20 February total generation equaled 2008 MW. Thus, this represents 80% of the total power the USACE wants to generate in the near future, if we use 2500 MW as the generation goal. Similarly, if we use 3000 MW as the standard, the island’s power plants are generating 67% of the goal.

chart (2)

What role has the USACE played in restoring the grid’s power generation capacities? An assessment conducted by PREPA and the New York  Power Authority found that most of Puerto Rico’s seven power plants experienced some damage because of Hurricane Maria. On 20 October 2017, the USACE’s Commanding General and Chief of Engineers, Lt. General Todd Semonite, explained that while damages to the grid’s transmission and distributions systems were the most challenging aspects of the restoration strategy, there was not “enough capacity in Puerto Rico’s existing power plants to provide electricity to the island.” Thus, one of the USACE’s main objectives was not only to work with PREPA to repair the existing power plants, but to also purchase and install new electricity generators.

On 16 October 2017, the USACE contracted the Pennsylvania-based Weston Solutions to install two 25MW generators in PREPA’s Palo Seco power plant. By the end of October, both plants were generating around 30MW of electricity, helping to “stabilize the power grid in the San Juan area”.  In an effort to provide electricity to manufacturing facilities, hospitals and other critical infrastructure in the southeastern towns of the island, the USACE awarded a contract in early November 2017 to Aptim Federal Services to install a 25MW generator in the Yabucoa power plant. The new generator became operational on 9 December 2017.

The USACE and PREPA, along with their contractors, have increased the grids capacity to generate electricity. While things have improved, it has been a slow process. And given the Stafford Act’s provisions, the most problematic aspect of this strategy is that these restoration efforts are not transforming the island’s electricity system. Hence the post-Maria electricity system will be highly dependent on fossil fuels and it will fail to meet current environmental standards.

The next posts will examine the USACE efforts to restore the electric grid’s transmission and distribution systems.


The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Emergency Power Installation in Post-Maria Puerto Rico

In my last post, I broke down the U.S. Army Corps’ Engineers’ (USACE) four-part strategy to restore Puerto Rico’s electric system post-Hurricanes Maria and Irma. The first of these parts is the installation of temporary emergency power generation.

On 1 November 2017, the USACE reported that its 249th Engineering Battalion established a record 366 temporary generators, beating the previous record of 310 installations set in 2007. The old record was connected to the USACE’s recovery efforts in Louisiana and neighboring states following Hurricane Katrina.

As of 16 February 2018, the USACE has installed 1,633 temporary generators and 782 are currently in operation. The graph below demonstrates the relationshop between the number of generators requested by FEMA and the Puerto Rican government to power  the island’s critical infrastructure facilities and other buildings providing emergency services and the amount of generators installed. The graph shows that the USACE and its contractors have so far met 95% of all requests.


The USACE has been making these data available via its social media accounts since 18 October 2017, which I have been collecting since late October 2017.

Because most of these generators are not meant to operate for long periods of time, the USACE’s personnel and its contractors have provided countless of hours of maintenance to its generators. The USACE has also fixed the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) and Puerto Rican government’s temporary generators.

In an effort to bring electricity to towns devastated by Hurricane Maria, the USACE has recently established several micro-grids throughout the island. So far, the USACE has installed micro-grids in Patillas, Maunabo, Naguabo, Yabucoa, Culebra, Lares, Villalba and Arecibo.

In the next post, I will review the USACE’s work in the second element of its four-part strategy to help the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority restore the island’s electric grid.

Note: Please note that these posts on the USACE’s work in Puerto Rico following Hurricanes Maria and Irma are part of a wider academic project. Feel free to contact me if you have any more information.


U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Power Restoration Strategy for Puerto Rico Post-Maria

In my previous post, I noted that Puerto Rico’s Governor, Ricardo Rosselló, has criticized the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ (USACE) efforts to restore electricity to Puerto Rico. His main criticism is that the USACE has not moved quickly enough to repair the island’s electrical system. In this post, I want to discuss the USACE’s role in the restoration efforts and its overall strategy.

The Robert T Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Act’s provisions inform the federal government’s responses to natural disasters. The act gives the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) the authority to coordinate the federal government’s relief efforts. FEMA relies on the USACE for emergency support for “public works and engineering-related” projects, which include everything from removing debris to the installment of “blue roofs”. FEMA can also provide the USACE long-term assignments in these areas, as it did on 30 September 2017 when FEMA tasked the USACE to assist PREPA’s efforts to rebuild the electric system.

Like FEMA, the USACE’s role in disaster relief is to support the state government’s restoration efforts. Thus, it is wrong to say that the USACE is in control over PREPA’s work. The USACE is part of the Power Restoration Task Force to Coordinate the Restoration Efforts. The following organizational chart, based on a recent PREPA document, captures the USACE’s role in the Task Force.

Organizational_Chart_PowerRest_TaskForce_PR2018 (1)

The USACE’s power restoration strategy can be divided into four elements. First, the USACE has been installing temporary emergency generators throughout the island. These generators, which most have been installed by the USACE’s 249th Engineering Battalion, have powered critical facilities, including hospitals, fire stations, water treatment plants, water pumps, and telecommunication towers and so forth.

The second set of efforts have been linked to the electricity system’s power generation capacities. The USACE’s goal has been to work closely with PREPA and private contractors to increase electricity generation to a level between 2,500 and 3,000 megawatts, which represents the electric system’s average peak load before the hurricanes struck the island.

The third element is the restoration of the electric transmission system. Hurricanes Irma and Maria destroyed 680 out of the 800 the transmissions towers that connect the system’s power plants to the distribution system. A recent study explains that only 15% of theses towers were built to withstand a Category 4 hurricane. It also noted the storm affected over two-thirds of the system’s 334 transmission and sub-transmission stations, which convert electricity to a lower voltage so it can be distributed to the system’s residential, governmental, commercial and industrial customers.

The fourth element is the rebuilding of the distribution system, which is “made up of roughly 1,200 circuits, with over 30,000 miles of overhead and underground lines.” Because that the system was not built to withstand a Category 4 storm, Hurricanes Irma and Maria knocked down over 50,000 utility poles and damaged close to 75% of the circuits.

This four-part strategy puts in perspective why restoring Puerto Rico’s electric system has been so challenging. And while the organizational chart shows that the USACE is not leading these efforts, for better and worse, it is the most important actor in the Task Force. In the next posts, we will look at the USACE’s work in the four elements of this strategy. This will give us an opportunity to further analyze its commitments to the overall effort.

Consequences of an Unrealistic Timeline: The Politics of Restoring Electricity to Puerto Rico’s Customers

BACKGROUND NOTE: In a previous post, titled “The Risk of Unrealistic Expectations”, I examine why restoring electricity to the island has been so slow. Since then, I have been researching this issue and it is now part of a wider academic project examining U.S.-Puerto Rico relations after Hurricane Maria. In this post, I focus on Governor Rosselló’s criticisms of the U.S. Army Corps Engineers’ (USACE) strategy and efforts to restore electricity to Puerto Rico’s customers following Hurricane Maria. The next posts look at the USACE’s strategy and examines the data connected to these efforts.

On 27 September 2017, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) ordered the U.S. Army Corps of the Engineers (USACE) to work with the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) to restore the island’s electric system, which was devastated by Hurricanes Maria and Irma.

From all the issues Puerto Rico has faced since Hurricane Maria, restoring electricity to the island’s customers has probably received the most media attention. It probably ranks as the most controversial topic of discussion among Puerto Ricans. The USACE’s efforts have not been  free from controversy. The main sticking point has been the timeline to restore electric service.

On 14 October 2017, writing in FEMA’s Blog, Brigadier General Diana Holland, the USACE’s Commander for the South Atlantic division, noted:

We believe that 80% of the system is affected, but that is only an estimate. We know that it took five months to restore the majority of power following Hurricane Georges… and I have been told that the damage this time is more extensive.

On that same day, Ricardo Rosselló, the island’s governor, announced PREPA’s timeline to restore electric service, promising that his administration would reestablish power to 95% of customers by 15 December 2017. Table 1 captures the governor’s timeline.

Table 1. Rosselló’s Timeline for Restoring the Electric System 


Generation Goal

Actual Generation


31 October 2017




15 November 2017




1 December 2017




15 December 2017




A week later Lieutenant General Todd Semonite, the Commanding General of the USACE, said that most Puerto Ricans should have power by the end of May 2018. The USACE’s timeline has not really changed since mid-October 2017. USACE officials believe that most customers will have power restored by the end of February 2018 and they hope to complete the entire project by May 2018.

Given the USACE’s views, why did Governor Rosselló announce such an unrealistic timeline? In an interview on 27 December 2017 with Agencia EFE, Rosselló insisted that USACE officials had personally assured him that they could meet his timeline. Of course, it is plausible that the governor was under this impression. But, it is unlikely that USACE agreed to this plan as PREPA’s executive director, Ricardo Ramos, told the press on 27 September 2017 that it would take six months to reestablish power to Puerto Rico’s customers. Moreover, repeated statements from the USACE personnel contradict Rosselló’s opinions on the matter.

In one of her recent columns, Sandra Rodriguez de Cotto argues that Ramos’s remarks did not sit well with the governor’s closest advisors. She also writes that the experience may have affected his connections to Rosselló’s inner circle and that his demeanor and body language had changed after the incident. Was Ramos pressured to conform with the governor’s timeline, even though he believed that it would take longer to reestablish power?

Two days before Rosselló’s announced his timeline, Ramos was asked by a reporter to explain when he thought power would be restore to the island’s customers, he said:

In terms of the power system restoration, for cultural reasons, we’re not saying exactly what the date is, because we will get expectations that will put pressure on the utility and its employees.

David Ferris of E&E News seems to have been surprised by Ramos’s remarks. He noted:

That statement would make the typical utility executive raise his or her eyebrows in disbelief. Confronted with angry customers, the CEOs of mainland U.S. power companies might prefer not to raise expectations about when a blackout will end. Yet they usually give their best guess, knowing that shrugging would only incur the wrath of customers and after them regulators and politicians.

Citing Puerto Rican lawmakers, Ferris concludes that Ramos’s statement is an outgrowth of PREPA’s corporate culture which places little value on transparency or public accountability. While his assessment is correct, his analysis fails to understand that Ramos’s statement was more calculated. Under pressure to conform with Rosselló’s more aggressive timeline, he decided to punt and let others answer the question.

It is this background that may explain why Ramos approved two controversial contracts with Whitefish Energy for $300 million and Cobra Energy for another $200 million. It could also explain why PREPA and the Rosselló administration did not sign mutual assistance agreements with the American Public Power Association (APPA) or other U.S. utilities in the mainland. Once these contracts were signed, PREPA officials believed these companies would help its crews meet the governor’s timeline.

But these decisions proved to be disastrous for the recovery efforts. FEMA and the USACE had not been informed of these two contracts and they did not approve them. Given Whitefish’s lack of experience, exorbitant charges and problems connected to the bidding process, the Rosselló administration was pressured by the U.S. Congress and FEMA to cancel the contract. While Rosselló distanced himself from the Whitefish scandal, emphasizing that he had little say in PREPA’s decisions, this strategy undermined Rosselló’s timeline and tainted his credibility with Puerto Ricans, lawmakers in Washington, and Trump administration officials.

After the cancellation of the Whitefish contract and frustrated by all the criticisms, Rosselló met with Nick Brown and Jessica Resnick-Ault of Reuters and during the interview he lashed out at the USACE blaming the slow progress to a “lack of urgency” among USACE officials. He noted that: “Everything that has been done right now has been done by PREPA or the subcontractors PREPA has had.” In addition, Rosselló told Brown and Resnick-Ault that because of the USACE’s slow efforts, his administration was pushed to sign mutual assistance agreements with utilities in New York and Florida to speed-up the recovery process.

Rosselló’s current views of the USACE’s efforts are still the same, but he has recently argued that the slow pace of the recovery efforts is tied to the island’s territorial status, suggesting the federal government has treated Puerto Rico’s disaster differently than other states’ natural disasters. Are Rosselló’s opinions correct? Has the USACE, when it comes to the the restoration of electric services, dropped the ball or treated Puerto Rico differently from other missions in the U.S. mainland?

I will explore in future posts. But for now, it seems clear that one reason why the restoration of electricity to Puerto Rico’s customers has been so slow can be linked to Rosselló’s decision to unveil an unrealistic timeline that pressured Ramos and his colleagues at PREPA to device an equally unrealistic strategy.

Why did Ricardo Rosselló Create Puerto Rico’s “Statehood Commission”?

Six months ago, Puerto Rico’s pro-statehood Governor, Ricardo Rosselló, signed a bill establishing the “Puerto Rico Equality Commission” – known today as the “Puerto Rico Statehood Commission”. The goal of the Commission is to help the Puerto Rican government lobby the U.S. Congress to admit the unincorporated U.S. territory as the nation’s 51st state. The bill stipulates that the Commission is part of ” the Puerto Rico Federal Affairs Administration (PRFAA)” and as such PRFAA “shall request and justify before the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Legislative Assembly the allocation of funds for the operations of the Commission as part of the budget thereof.”

Inspired by the Tennessee Plan, the Commission’s seven members serve as “shadow lawmakers” asking Congress to recognize them as Puerto Rico’s representatives. Thus, two of these members serve as “shadow” senators and the rest are “shadow” congressmen. The strategy went into effect this week. On January 10, 2018, Jennifer González Colón, Puerto Rico’s Resident Commissioner, in a speech in the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives asked the U.S. Congress to recognize and seat the Commission’s members in their respective chambers.

After her “historic” speech, she joined the Commission’s member and Governor Rosselló for a press conference to explain their strategy’s rationale. In many ways, Rosselló and the Commission’s members noted that they wanted to end the island’s colonial history and its second-class status, while also fulfilling the will of the voters who favored statehood in the controversial plebiscite held on June 11, 2017.

Why has Rosselló and the leaders of the pro-statehood New Progressive Party (NPP) pursued this strategy? After all, the island and its residents are still coping with the aftermath of Hurricane Maria. In addition, while the statehood option received 97% of the votes in the June plebiscite, only 23% of registered voters participated in the process – raising question about the validity of the vote. Both the White House and Congress have demonstrated little interest in Puerto Rico’s status question and statehood does not enjoy widespread support among Democratic or Republican lawmakers at this time.

Also, the strategy seems to be poorly executed. Here are at least two criticisms. First, the Commission’s website has not been updated recently. For instance, the site fails to mention that Alfonso Aguilar, who replaced Felix Santoni, is a member of the Commission. It also fails to explain who the “shadow senators” and “shadow congressmen” actually are. Plus the site fails to provide biographical notes for each of its members. Even worse, it is not clear how people can contact the Commission.

Second, the press conference was not even transmitted via C-SPAN. The best we have is a shaky Facebook Live video captured with a cell phone. If this was a serious effort, the Governor should have paid a videographer to tape the conference and share segments of the press conference with major news outlets and make a full copy available via YouTube.

If the goal of the conference was to raise awareness about Puerto Rico’s statehood aspirations, it is not clear that this was achieved. Google Trends data for January 10, 2018 does show that interest in Puerto Rico among Google users in the United States increased. But interest was not driven by the announcement of the Statehood Commission, but by the tsunami alert issued for Puerto Rico following a 7.6 earthquake off Hondura’s coast.

A search in the TV News archive for January 10 and 11, 2017 also shows that the tsunami alert dominated the news coverage during the morning of the 10th, while the news coverage connected to Puerto Rico for the rest of the 10th and the 11th was connected to a national shortage of IV bags, many of which are produced in Puerto Rico. The single mention of the Statehood Commission is linked to a C-SPAN video of González Colón’s speech on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives.

An although some print and online media did cover the news conference and Rosselló’s plan, a MediaCloud search shows that coverage of the Statehood Commission was overshadowed by other issues connected with the island’s slow recovery after Hurricane Maria.

In many ways, the goal of González Colón’s speech and the subsequent press conference was to try to unify the NPP and to try to remake Rosselló’s image as leader of the NPP and of Puerto Rico. Before Hurricane Maria, Rosselló was seen by many as a competent leader. Today, that is not the case. Some prominent lawmakers and Trump administration officials have questioned his decisions, many Puerto Ricans seem to be losing hope that he (and his administration, including the First Lady) can lead the Puerto Rican government forward, and many of the NPP’s leaders have either undermined his authority or are ready to do so in the near future. This last point especially applies to the Republican members of the Commission and the NPP who have raised questions of Rosselló’s criticisms of the Trump administration and the Republican Party following passage of the federal tax bill.

It is difficult to foresee what impact Puerto Rico’s slow recovery or the current state of US-Puerto Rican relations will have on the aspirations of the pro-statehood movement. But if Rosselló cannot find ways to secure the island’s streets, rebuild the electricity grid and get Congress to finance Puerto Rico’s recovery, many Puerto Ricans are not only going to question Rosselló’s governorship but his strategy of combining his fight for statehood with the island’s post-Maria recovery.  If this happens, the Commission’s credibility will weaken and pro-statehood Puerto Ricans’ dreams will also fade with time.